

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 7 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Sir Harold BEELEY

(United Kingdom)

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS  
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES  
Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. M.E. BRIMAH  
Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV  
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN  
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. J.H. TAHOUDIN  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. G. BUNN  
Mr. C.G. BREAM  
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the two hundred and seventy-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) (translation from French): During our opening meeting on 27 January my delegation stressed the reasons why it shared the idea that we must not lose sight of our major responsibility of working for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.235). My delegation is aware that the extreme difficulty of this problem and the serious concern to which the present international situation gives rise are not likely to facilitate our task in this field. Nevertheless it is undeniable that, precisely because of this difficulty and this concern, we must redouble our efforts to emerge from the stagnation which could well affect the cause of disarmament despite the fresh stimulus it received last September at the General Assembly. This stagnation is becoming increasingly unacceptable for two main reasons.

First, the nuclear arsenal of delivery vehicles and nuclear and thermo-nuclear warheads has gone beyond all conceivable limits, both in their destructive force, the lightning speed with which destruction can be inflicted, and in their range of action, from which no part of the world can now escape.

Secondly, profound transformations are taking place on the international scene at the present time. We must bear these transformations in mind and take advantage of them in order to render the rigid positions adopted by both sides more flexible and thus induce in them the necessary suppleness and a better adaptation to present-day realities.

There is no question of our solving at this session the problem of general and complete disarmament; but it is our duty to make the best possible use of the time still left to us before the General Assembly meets, in order to endeavour to advance our work in this field in a substantial way, in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly. That is our well-defined duty, but how are we to discharge it? To do so, perhaps we should first ask ourselves the question, where do we stand in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament?

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

At present, these negotiations are mainly concentrated, and rightly so, on a key problem, that of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. A discussion on this subject in our Committee became possible when the Soviet Union accepted the principle of maintaining a fixed number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), thus coming into line with the United States proposal in this regard (ENDC/30), in order to take into account the preoccupations of the Western delegations. At one time we thought that this discussion and exchange of views would be fruitful; but alas! they were not.

It was then that the Soviet delegation proposed that the Committee should adopt a specific procedural measure. We are referring to the proposal made by Mr. Zorin in 1964 (ENDC/PV.188,p.17) that a working group should be set up to deal with this problem. Commendable efforts were made in our Committee to reach agreement on the terms of reference of that working group. Unfortunately those efforts were unsuccessful. The divergencies between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union on some essential items of the terms of reference were so profound that the discussion soon reached a dead end.

One of the reasons for the impasse was that the idea of retaining a fixed number of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles until the end of the disarmament process was found to be too much entangled in the details of each of the two draft treaties -- those of the United States and the Soviet Union -- on general and complete disarmament and strongly influenced by the different philosophies, methods and timings of the two drafts, so much so that it suffices to touch upon any aspect of the question of the nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to be retained under each of the two draft treaties to set quivering immediately all the notes of discordance between the two drafts.

That is why the Swedish delegation, in a first commendable attempt to overcome the obstacles which thus needlessly blocked the discussion of this idea of nuclear deterrence, proposed (ENDC/PV.202,p.10) that we should concentrate our attention on the status of the quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles that would be retained during stage III. One of the merits of such a method is to avoid, at least in the first round, the snag of the difficult problem of choosing the method by which the residual number of nuclear delivery vehicles would be decided.

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The Soviet delegation replied positively to that proposal when Mr. Tsarapkin declared at our meeting on 15 March that his delegation would have no objection to taking up the study of stage III, on which a certain similarity in the positions of the sides had become apparent. He added: "As was suggested, for example, by the delegation of Sweden on 28 July 1964." (ENDC/PV.248, p.25). The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, also confirmed the importance of this attitude when he said:

"We think that the idea of examining the last stage proposed for general and complete disarmament -- an idea originally advanced by the Swedish delegation -- should be seriously considered. It has many possibilities." (ENDC/PV.249, p.11).

My delegation has no objection to studying the status of the quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained in stage III, if the Committee so desires. However, it feels that if we embark on a study of the nuclear shield, umbrella or instrument of nuclear deterrence in relation to stage III, there will still be the fear that neither the United States nor the Soviet draft will fail to make the most of its links with the nuclear shield, umbrella or instrument of nuclear deterrence in order to give this the impress of its own concept, that of the United States or that of the Soviet Union. That would bring up the whole question of disarmament again and would not facilitate our task of conciliation between the two different viewpoints.

To avoid that, we think it would perhaps be advisable first of all to isolate the idea itself of nuclear deterrence from the particularism of the two drafts and try to study it per se within the context of disarmament. Once the idea of deterrence has been separated and its essential characteristics identified, we shall thus be able to obtain a certain concept of nuclear deterrence which could clarify and determine the concrete form of the instrument itself -- the nuclear "hardware" -- made available under this concept. It will then be easy, in order to give shape to the instrument of deterrence, to take advantage of the useful elements contained either in the United States draft or the Soviet draft.

Obviously the complex and delicate task of elucidating the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be carried out by one delegation alone. We shall therefore limit ourselves to shedding some light on certain essential aspects of that concept, with the help of the useful contributions made by the other delegations here present.

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

To begin with, we can consider that the first aspect of this concept which we have to elucidate relates to its importance, which is evident from the interest shown by the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the idea of retaining a certain number of nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. A considerable part of the discussions in recent years has been devoted to this question.

These discussions show that the idea of nuclear deterrence has become the subject of a measure of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union since the Soviet Government amended its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament so as to make possible the retention of a given quantity of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of the disarmament process.

It is this first aspect of this concept that we must stress very clearly from the outset of our work, because the attention we must give it in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament is justified by the importance which the two nuclear super-Powers attach to it.

But what is the function generally attributed to the retention of these terrible weapons during the disarmament process? The reason given so far by each of the two super-Powers is their concern to be reasonably assured that they would not be the object of a nuclear attack by an aggressor acting in bad faith during the disarmament process. However, while this reason may suffice for the nuclear Powers who possess these weapons, it cannot suffice for the rest of the world. Indeed, what of the overwhelming majority of people who do not possess these weapons, who consider them illegal, and are terrified by the nature and magnitude of their destructive power? Those people, in their turn, have only one legitimate concern: to be rid of such weapons completely and immediately under effective international control.

This attitude of the non-nuclear countries would be difficult to reconcile with acceptance of the idea of retaining these nuclear weapons for any reason whatsoever. This leads me, as the representative of a non-aligned and non-nuclear country, to explain the position of my delegation towards our participation in the discussion of this idea of nuclear deterrence during the disarmament process.

If we associate ourselves with other delegations to define more clearly this idea, which is based on the retention of nuclear weapons, that does not in any way imply that we approve of the principle. In other words, if we agree to consider this idea within the context of a programme of general and complete disarmament, it is for a very definite reason: namely, that the idea of nuclear deterrence has

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become, in spite of us, the only condition that in the present circumstances enables the two super-Powers and our Committee usefully to carry on discussions on general and complete disarmament. Consequently, in our opinion, it has to be recognized that nuclear deterrence should only be conceived or accepted in order to facilitate the discussion and accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. The concept of nuclear deterrence thus appears as an instrument resulting from circumstances and would answer to a well-defined practical need: to bring us nearer to general and complete disarmament, to set us going in some way along the path to general and complete disarmament.

If we accept that definition of the function of deterrence, it follows that, when the idea is given concrete form, any element outside the limits of that function must be eliminated. Thus nuclear weapons retained during the disarmament process must not serve in any way to influence international relations for the benefit of any particular nuclear Power, and for all the more reason must not be used to commit aggression.

The concept of nuclear deterrence, while taking into account the concern of each nuclear Power to be reasonably sheltered from nuclear attack, would thus facilitate general and complete disarmament, which is the primary objective of the international community. But the interests of this community — and of the non-nuclear countries in particular — also require just as urgently that everything should be done to reduce the danger and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war during the disarmament process. In other words, nuclear deterrence as conceived for the purpose of assuaging the fears of the nuclear Powers must take into account this legitimate dual concern of the international community and the non-nuclear countries.

To meet these interests, two main conditions must be fulfilled:

- (1) The spread of nuclear weapons must be stopped at once through an acceptable non-proliferation treaty — which is what we hope to achieve here;
- (2) Furthermore, deterrence must be organized in practice in such a way that it would in fact result in the neutralization of the opposing nuclear forces. This should be one of the important directives to be given to the working group entrusted with this question.



(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

It is true that the deterrence resulting from the present nuclear balance has functioned somehow or other between the United States and the Soviet Union, and no nuclear attack has taken place since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the question which all the peoples of the world are asking is, how long can we continue to rely on the hazard of such a delicate and dangerous balance? There is no doubt that we are faced with an intolerable situation which is getting more and more complicated every day and from which we must find a way out.

My delegation considers that an agreement on the function of deterrence which we have just proposed would facilitate examination of the type of nuclear shield or umbrella which would be acceptable during the disarmament process.

By way of illustration, my delegation proposes to examine the way in which this concept would affect each of the intrinsic elements of the instrument of deterrence, namely --

- (1) the level or number of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained;
- (2) their categories and types;
- (3) their deployment.

In regard to the first of these elements: if we start from our concept of a nuclear deterrence meant to facilitate disarmament, we may ask what would be the level of the instrument intended to play this part. Should it be high, medium or low?

It is not for us to fix even an approximate figure. It is for the working group to do that. But such a group could have before it certain general guidelines. It must, first of all, eliminate immediately from its calculations any nuclear weapons which would exceed that function, since the nuclear weapons to be retained provisionally would be intended exclusively for preventing a nuclear attack.

It follows that the risk of nuclear escalation during the disarmament process -- a risk created by the use of nuclear weapons to repel an attack carried out with conventional weapons -- must be eliminated. In fact, it would not be realistic to ensure the security of nuclear Powers against a direct nuclear attack and at the same time neglect the danger of a nuclear attack indirectly through escalation.

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That observation renders acutely topical the chronic problem of ~~sonvanticnal~~ security in Europe, where in consequence of the cold war tactical nuclear weapons exist side by side with conventional weapons, thus making nuclear escalation possible. We earnestly hope, with the peoples of Europe, that these tactical nuclear weapons will never be used, either now or during disarmament. But the risk is ever present in a Europe which has been the scene of two world wars in twenty-five years and which has today become an armed camp.

What, then, must we do without delay if we want to continue our discussions fruitfully on this point and give them a realistic look? In our opinion it would perhaps be advisable if, parallel with our discussions on the instrument of nuclear deterrence, exchanges of views or negotiations were to begin immediately between the parties concerned in Europe, either in another working group or in another forum of their choice, in order to find alternative solutions capable of ensuring in Europe adequate security against any attack with conventional weapons.

In this regard there is no lack of formulas. Some have been submitted during the Conference in the form of collateral measures: observation posts, exchange of military observers, reduction or withdrawal of troops, a non-aggression pact, and so on; and other solutions can be found along this path.

Surely to banish the spectre of nuclear escalation and at the same time to work in earnest to achieve security against the use of conventional weapons would help to abolish the sequelae of the cold war and the peace settlement of the Second World War. That is the more true since all those concerned are loud in proclaiming that their objective is the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of all these questions. That being so, the working group should also be guided by the general feeling that it is in the overriding interests of all of us to keep this instrument of deterrence at a low level.

Some delegations of non-aligned countries have already spoken in the Committee of a minimal nuclear deterrence. For its part, the Soviet Union has spoken of a limited number of certain nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained. In its turn, the United States has indicated its intention actually to reduce its existing nuclear arsenal and, consequentially, to reduce the level of the possible instrument of deterrence, and this when it has envisaged the possibility of big reductions in the number of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the context of its proposals concerning a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and its general proposals

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concerning the cessation of the production of fissile material for military purposes and the destruction of nuclear weapons (ENDC/120). At our meeting on 14 June Mr. Foster urgently requested delegations to examine these proposals seriously and to suggest methods of approach (ENDC/PV.264, p.13).

In reply to his appeal we would suggest that the United States proposals can be of great interest when there is a serious discussion on the level of the instrument of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, if the points of view on the instrument of nuclear deterrence coincide, not only can the obstacles which now stand in the way of these proposals no longer have any purpose, but it is by studying proposals of this kind that a level acceptable to both sides could be fixed for the instrument of deterrence.

Furthermore, my delegation considers that this approach to the study of the number of nuclear weapon vehicles to be retained could help us to overcome the obstacle of the divergence between the United States position, which insists on a gradual reduction of nuclear vehicles, and the Soviet position, which, on the contrary, insists on a massive reduction of these vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. In fact, we believe that the problem would lose much of its acuteness if the Committee were to undertake a study of the instrument of nuclear deterrence on the lines we have just described.

As for the categories and types of the instrument of nuclear deterrence, we think that the two super-Powers ought to discuss this element of nuclear deterrence in the working group. But there is a general problem which the Committee could study here and now. If the instrument of deterrence is intended to neutralize the opposing nuclear forces, a certain degree of stabilization is necessary throughout the disarmament process. Without this stabilization the process of general and complete disarmament, as it proceeds, will be at the mercy of any technical development of nuclear weapons.

This raises the problem of the continuous allocation of resources and energy by the nuclear Powers to the creation or improvement of nuclear weapons. This fact is the more regrettable because nuclear security thus becomes more and more illusory, not to mention the considerable expense of such developments. It is to be hoped that the Soviet Union and the United States will lose no time in adopting a policy of mutual example in order to put an end to this dangerous and useless race in improving nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Hence the capital importance of the cessation of underground tests as a brake on the development of nuclear weapons.

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I now come to the third element of the instrument of deterrence: deployment of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. Deterrence, as we conceive it, would have the effect of limiting the deployment of these dangerous weapons. Here can be seen quite clearly the great value of two collateral measures: the conclusion of an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation, and the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. The adoption of these two measures, if adequately conceived and applied, would make the practical problem of the deployment of nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process much easier to solve and would help to safeguard the nuclear security of the non-nuclear States.

The delegation of the United Arab Republic considers a non-proliferation treaty and the establishment of denuclearized zones greatly preferable to any guarantees of protection given by alliances or nuclear Powers.

To sum up, we believe that realistic negotiations on general and complete disarmament can be usefully carried on in our Committee on the basis of the following practical proposals:

First, the adoption by the Committee of a minimum common concept of nuclear deterrence during the disarmament process, on the broad lines we have just submitted to the Conference.

Second, the appointment of a working group which, on the basis of this common concept, would study the establishment of the most appropriate instrument of nuclear deterrence.

Third, immediate study by the parties concerned of the chronic problem of conventional security in Europe, in order to eliminate the risk of nuclear escalation.

The delegation of the United Arab Republic believes that the adoption of such a programme of work by the Conference would have the effect of getting our negotiations under way, and would thus take account of the realities of today, when everyone is very anxious to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. All this would at the same time help to create the necessary climate for getting rid of the sequelae of the cold war, for strengthening the cause of peaceful co-existence, and for bringing about inevitably a universal dialogue on nuclear disarmament.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In view of the fact that, in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Committee (ENDC/PV.264, p.25), we are to discuss today questions of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation intends to speak on the subject of collateral measures in the field of disarmament. Since this is our intention, it would be correct if we were to find out first whether there are any other speakers on general and complete disarmament, so that we may take the floor only after all those wishing to speak on that subject have had an opportunity to do so. Therefore I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to enquire whether any other representatives wish to speak on the subject of general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his observations and shall ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor on the subject of general and complete disarmament.

It appears that there are no further speakers on that subject, and I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union to resume his speech.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with great interest to the very detailed statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic. We shall study it with all the attention that such a detailed and interesting statement deserves. In speaking on the subject of general and complete disarmament we shall endeavour to give replies to a number of questions which were touched upon in the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic.

Now I should like to take up the subject which our delegation has decided to deal with in its statement today. At previous meetings we dwelt on the question of what specific steps should be taken at the present time in order to achieve agreement on such an important issue of nuclear disarmament as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question of non-proliferation, which is justifiably regarded in this Committee as its primary task, does not of course exhaust the whole field of nuclear disarmament and the warding-off of the menace of a nuclear war. We believe -- and this opinion is shared by many other delegations -- that efforts to ward off the danger of a nuclear war should be made in a number of directions, seeking, besides

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non-proliferation, the adoption of other effective measures to free mankind from the threat of a nuclear war.

In its statement today the Soviet delegation intends to dwell on two questions: that of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and that of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

The question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is being examined by the Eighteen-Nation Committee in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly. As we know, the twentieth session of the General Assembly was to have discussed this important and urgent problem -- I am referring to item 29 of the General Assembly's agenda: "Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament".

At the meeting of the First Committee held on 29 November 1965 the representative of Ethiopia made the following statement on this subject:

"We realize that item 29 on the agenda of the General Assembly is very important. The Ethiopian delegation and Government attach great importance to this subject. We believe that it would not be fair to limit the discussion of this very important item to one or two days. Therefore, unless there is some objection, we would prefer to send the item back to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to debate it next year when there will be ample time available" (A/C.1/PV.1388, p.12).

Precisely such a decision was taken by the First Committee and endorsed at a plenary session of the General Assembly. A letter from the Chairman of the First Committee to the President of the United Nations General Assembly stated:

"At its 1390th meeting, held on 30 November 1965, the First Committee decided to refer the item [that is, item 29 of the General Assembly's agenda] to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for further study and to defer consideration of this item in the General Assembly until its twenty-first session" (A/C.1/PV.1390, p.17).

Thus the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons was referred by the General Assembly to this Committee for further study for the purpose of finding

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the proper solution to this most important problem. It is noteworthy that at the twentieth session of the Assembly no one -- not even the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom -- objected to the above-mentioned decision of the General Assembly. Therefore there can be no question of the need to carry out the Assembly's recommendation and to examine carefully, here in the Committee, the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This we must do; we must give to this problem the attention it deserves.

The question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons has long been ripe for solution. The idea of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons has met with wide support on the part of most of the States Members of the United Nations. Now that the Eighteen-Nation Committee is looking forward to the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, the achievement of agreement on such a comparatively uncomplicated but exceptionally important question as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be a considerable success in the work of our Committee.

On the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union adopts a clear-cut and definite position. We consider that, on the way towards the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons -- an aim which the Soviet Union seeks consistently -- an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded without delay. The Soviet Government also expresses its readiness to reach an agreement that the nuclear Powers should assume the obligation not to be the first to use such weapons. In his message of 1 February to this Committee the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin, stated:

"The Soviet Union is prepared to assume immediately an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, provided that the other nuclear Powers do likewise" (ENDC/167, p.3).

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There is a sound basis for the solution of this problem. Five years will soon have elapsed since, on the initiative of Ethiopia and other African and Asian States and with the support of the socialist countries, the sixteenth session of the General Assembly adopted in 1961 the well-known Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In the course of the disarmament negotiations this important document has often been referred to. The further the nuclear arms race develops and the more acute the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war becomes, the more urgently and insistently resound the words of the Declaration that -

"(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations, and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

"... (d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization" (A/RES/1653(XVI)).

Thus the United Nations and all the peoples of the world have outlawed nuclear weapons as a threat to all mankind, not only to the present generation but to future generations as well. That recommendation of the United Nations expresses the determination of the peoples of the world to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, and all States are called upon to act strictly in accordance with that recommendation.

The conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, or, in the first instance, the adoption by the nuclear Powers of a solemn obligation not to be the first to use them, would represent a major contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament. This measure would considerably reduce the threat of the actual use of nuclear weapons.

The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would also contribute to the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of such weapons. The absence of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons serves as a magnet for those seeking to acquire such weapons. If we succeeded in reaching agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, that would act as a curb on the strivings of certain States to obtain access in one form or another to these weapons and would thus remove some of the obstacles in the way of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.



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What is required in order to solve the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons? There must be a sincere desire on the part of the nuclear Powers and of all States to accomplish this measure. At previous sessions of the Committee energetic voices were heard speaking in favour of concluding an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; and now, at the current session of the Committee, we once again hear delegations calling for the use of nuclear weapons to be outlawed. At our meeting of 5 July the earliest possible achievement of agreement on this question was urged by the representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (ENDC/PV.270, p.5) and the Socialist Republic of Romania (ibid., p.22). And, before that, at the meeting of the Committee held on 30 June, the representative of Mexico expressed alarm about the increasing threat of a nuclear war and referred to resolution 1653(XVI) of the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, pointing out that the use of such weapons was "contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity" (ENDC/PV.269, p.24).

On what does the solution of this question in the Committee hinge? Until now, as we know, the United States and the United Kingdom, two Western nuclear Powers represented on the Eighteen-Nation Committee, have refused to come to an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. At the sixteenth session of the General Assembly they voted against the adoption of the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

The United States delegation has adduced arguments which were formulated as long as four years ago in a letter from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 30 June 1962 (A/5174, Annex II, p.78). It asserts, as does the United Kingdom delegation, that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an "illusory" and "unrealistic" measure which allegedly would have no practical significance. In support of this argument they say that a ban on the use of nuclear weapons will not be respected, that its observance cannot be guaranteed.

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We can in no way agree with such an argument. The best guarantee of the observance of agreements is the interest which the parties to them have in their being observed. Are not the peoples interested in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe? Will not this interest be a reliable means of ensuring the effectiveness of an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons? In the past there has already been a ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the results have been positive. It is well known that the agreement to ban weapons of chemical and bacteriological warfare has been and is being respected by those countries that have signed it. The existence of that agreement to some extent contributed to the fact that, even in the years of ferocious hostilities of the Second World War, the belligerents did not use poisonous substances or means of artificially causing epidemic diseases, even though they had the appropriate types of weapons at their disposal at the time.

But if it proved possible to prevent the use of poison gas and bacteriological warfare, why cannot the same be done in regard to an even more terrible means of waging war, namely modern nuclear weapons, which if used would condemn to death hundreds of millions of people indiscriminately, with no distinction between front line and rear, military personnel and civilian population? This must certainly be done.

As for the arguments of the United States delegation regarding the "illusory" nature of decisions prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, of course we all know that the United States has not ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. And it is precisely the United States, as has been reported more than once, that has used chemical weapons in its war of aggression against the people of Viet-Nam. Apparently the United States wants to keep its hands free also where nuclear weapons are concerned.

International commitments are assumed by States in order to carry them out. But if one deliberately approaches any particular agreement with the assertion that it will be "impracticable" or "illusory", then, of course, it would be altogether impossible to conclude any international treaty or agreement at all. At our meeting of 5 July the representative of Romania, Mr. Dumitrescu, put a legitimate question

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to those who claim that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons will not in itself represent a guarantee that these weapons will not be used. He asked: "If the use of nuclear weapons is not prohibited, will that give us an assurance that they will not be used ...?" (ENDC/PV.270, p.23).

The Western delegations have also asserted that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would not in itself create an atmosphere of confidence. That argument is also contained in the aforementioned letter of Secretary of State Rusk. But it is legitimate to ask the question: in circumstances where there is no prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, is there more confidence or tranquillity? Is it not clear that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or the assumption by the nuclear Powers of an obligation not to be the first to use these weapons, would precisely contribute to the establishment of international confidence? After all, such a step would confirm that the parties to such an agreement have not aggressive intentions towards one another and do not intend to start a nuclear war.

In the aforementioned letter of Mr. Rusk the argument was also used that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would not eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, and that this could be achieved only through the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. Yes, the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament is undoubtedly the best and most reliable way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. But what weight has this argument of the United States now, when throughout the years of negotiation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee -- and not only in the Committee -- the United States has shown even more clearly that ~~it~~ is not seeking general and complete disarmament at all? References to the problem of general and complete disarmament were then needed by the United States representatives in order to try to evade the examination and solution of the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

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At present, when we are discussing, for instance, the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or any other measures for reducing international tension, it does not occur to anyone in the Committee -- including, I assume, the United States delegation -- to refuse to discuss these measures on the grounds that such measures do not eliminate completely the threat of a nuclear war. Pending general and complete disarmament, as is generally recognized, one must still try to take steps which would help to improve the international situation. In this respect prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be precisely the measure that would help towards solving the problem of nuclear disarmament.

If the United States does not intend to make use of nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes, what then prevents it from adopting the Soviet proposal that the nuclear Powers assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? If the United States and the United Kingdom do not regard nuclear weapons as a means intended for blackmailing and intimidating other peoples, then there is no need for them to search for specious pretexts in order to evade a solution of the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

The United Nations General Assembly, which requested the Committee to consider the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2031 (XX); ENDC/161), expects us to take definite steps towards solving this question. The Soviet delegation suggests that here in the Committee we prepare, in time for the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, specific recommendations on the question of convening an international conference for the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. We also suggest that the Eighteen-Nation Committee address an appeal to the nuclear Powers to assume, as a first step on the road to the conclusion of such a convention, a solemn obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation hopes that the members of the Committee will examine this important question in all seriousness and make every effort to contribute to its solution.

A very important problem recommended by the General Assembly for consideration in the Committee (A/RES/2032 (XX); ENDC/161) is the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests. We have already set forth in a general way the position of the Soviet

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Union on this problem in our statement of 14 June (ENDC/PV.264, pp.20 et seq.). Bearing in mind the importance of this problem, we should like in our statement today to explain further the point of view of the Soviet Union in regard to it.

First of all, it must be emphasized that the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests would be a considerable obstacle in the path of the further improvement of nuclear weapons. The implementation of this measure would undoubtedly prevent the appearance in the armouries of the nuclear Powers of new and still more devastating types of weapons of mass destruction. The prohibition of underground nuclear tests would in fact eliminate the opportunities for carrying out experiments with nuclear weapons and would contribute to the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of these weapons. In their statements the representatives of many countries members of this Committee have rightly devoted great attention to the question of prohibiting underground tests, and have called for a speedy solution of this important problem.

For many years now we have been seeking to bring about the prohibition of tests of such weapons. As a result we succeeded in reaching agreement on a partial prohibition covering nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1). There is also a possibility of achieving the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests. Indeed, all the participants in the present negotiations recognize the necessity of such a prohibition. There is a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the earliest possible prohibition of such tests. There are noteworthy proposals by the non-aligned countries (ENDC/158).

Nevertheless, there is still no solution of this problem. Nearly three years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments, which provides for the use of national means of detection and identification alone for the purpose of control. And yet at one time there were persistent demands concerning the need for the establishment of international control, by means of which alone, in the opinion of certain Western Powers, it would be possible to guarantee the effective cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

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The Soviet Union has stated time and again that for the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, national means of detecting and identifying underground seismic events are sufficient. I should like to stress once again that precisely national means of detection, and not international on-site inspections, are the effective key that will enable us to achieve our aim of prohibiting completely all nuclear weapon tests. Hence the Soviet Union is prepared to reach an agreement on the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection for verifying the fulfilment of the commitments in respect of the cessation of underground nuclear explosions.

Unfortunately the United States and its partners in Western alliances have taken a different stand on the question of putting an end to underground tests. They have continued up to now to demand as a necessity the establishment of international control over the observance of an agreement in this regard. In making this demand the United States is creating an artificial obstacle in the way of the achievement of the agreement which we seek.

Why is the United States so stubbornly insisting on international inspection? It is doing this in order to prevent the achievement of an agreement, so that it can remain free to continue underground tests for the purpose of developing new types of nuclear weapons. The United States continues to carry out a series of underground tests one after another. Less than three years after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, the United States has, according to official information published in that country, carried out more than ninety underground tests, including twenty-seven underground nuclear explosions announced during the first half of this year alone. There is information showing that the United States Government has undertaken a programme of further underground nuclear tests which is planned for several years ahead. This is shown as we have already noted, by the 1965 report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

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United States leaders have expressed satisfaction at the way in which underground nuclear weapon tests in the United States are being carried out. Thus in August last year Senator Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Sub-Committee and of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, stated that, thanks to the efforts and talent of United States scientists in Los Alamos and Livermore, a series of underground nuclear explosions had been carried out which had helped to improve the quality of production of nuclear weapons to an even greater extent than was deemed possible by most scientists only two years ago. That statement is quoted from Atomic Energy Report No. 32, pages 3 and 4, dated 9 August 1965, published in Washington.

The continued objection to the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests by leading circles of the United States was commented upon quite recently by the United States journalist Mr. John W. Finney. In an article entitled "U.S. Critics Shun Plan on A-pact" Mr. Finney pointed out:

"The basic objection, primarily from the Atomic Energy Commission and the military, according to Administration sources, was that the small political gains of such a step would be outweighed by the possible military risks... A ban on larger underground tests could prevent development of effective atomic warheads for an anti-ballistic missile system" (The New York Times, International Edition, 1 July 1966, p.3).

As you see, this is all quite clearly and precisely stated. Further tests are needed by the United States Government for the improvement of its weapons. So the ending of tests is rated very low, as merely providing "small political gains".

The Soviet Union is convinced that all countries and all mankind will derive great advantages from the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. They will derive not only political or moral advantage, but their health will no longer be threatened by dangerous radioactivity. The Soviet delegation notes with great satisfaction the considerable interest shown in our Committee by the representatives of a number of the Member States in the solution of the problem of the prohibition of underground

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nuclear weapon tests. Their proposals reflect their great concern and desire to make progress in arriving at an appropriate international agreement.

We have already stated that the Soviet Union is prepared to settle the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests on the basis of the proposal made by the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259). We are referring to the proposal to prohibit underground nuclear explosions above a certain threshold of magnitude, and to declare a moratorium on nuclear explosions below that threshold. The proposals set forth in the Committee by the Swedish delegation merit attention. They provide for the establishment of a "detection club" and also for the right of parties to a treaty on the prohibition of underground tests to withdraw from the treaty in certain circumstances (ENDC/154). In this connexion we should like to point out that the author of these proposals, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, rightly considers that -

"... for purposes of detection and identification, even of underground tests -- that is, for recording seismic events and for attempting to separate those indicating man-made explosions from natural earth tremors -- we are going to use national observation posts and national interpretation of the data obtained" (ENDC/PV.247, p.16).

It should be pointed out that in the remarks of the United States representatives on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests the desirability of an early cessation of underground tests and of the achievement of an appropriate agreement is stressed in words, but in fact the United States rejects constructive proposals prohibiting underground tests. If the United States really desires a comprehensive agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, it must reconsider its position and agree to a solution of this question on the basis of the use of national means for the detection and identification of underground events.

The prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, as well as the prevention of their dissemination and the prohibition of their use, are all questions which require an



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immediate solution. If we succeeded in solving these important questions, then we should certainly be able to solve much more easily other more complex problems of disarmament as well.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Two interesting statements have been made this morning, and we shall study them carefully and respond at a later meeting. In some remarks which I propose to make here a little later this morning I shall answer some of the contentions of the Soviet representative about United States testing and the United States position with respect to banning underground tests.

However, before turning to those remarks I should like to respond to his charge that the United States is engaging in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. That is not true. Secretary of State Rusk has made it clear on several occasions that that is a misstatement. We have used riot-control agents -- tear gas. These have been and are designed to reduce danger to civilians and others and to minimize loss of life in connexion with the activities in which we must engage. As I think all members of this Committee know, such materials are used in many parts of the world for that purpose. Incidentally, they have nothing to do with the Geneva Protocol.

I should now like to mention a development that appears very promising. The Chairman of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has announced that, beginning 12 July, a meeting of the Legal Sub-Committee of that body will convene here in Geneva to consider a draft treaty governing the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies. This is a most welcome development. I am sure that each one of us here shares the hope that the Sub-Committee's work will lead to a treaty which will facilitate international co-operation in the exploration of celestial bodies and ensure that they will be used for peaceful purposes only.

I should now like to make the remarks concerning a comprehensive test-ban treaty which I had planned to make last Tuesday.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Those who voted for General Assembly resolution 2032 (XX) agreed that our Committee should seek a comprehensive test-ban treaty "with a sense of urgency" (ENDC/161). In voting for it, they noted the "crucial importance" of such a treaty "to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (ibid.). My delegation continues to support those statements of priority.

As we all know, the reason we have not succeeded in banning underground tests after all the years of trying to do so is that there are differences concerning verification, to which the Soviet representative referred this morning. I say "verification", rather than "on-site inspection", advisedly. We do not ask for inspection for the sake of inspection. We ask for verification because we believe it essential to our security that, having concluded a treaty, we have confidence that any potential adversary is observing faithfully the same solemn undertakings affecting the development of new nuclear weapon systems as those we ourselves observe; and we would offer any potential adversary equal opportunity to verify our observance of those undertakings.

We do not seek inspection of seismic events which do not require inspection. The United States proposed, negotiated, signed and ratified a treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) which bans by far the most important kind of testing but provides for no on-site inspections at all. In that case, after considerable research, we concluded that on-site inspection was not necessary to verify whether the reciprocal restraints of the treaty were being observed by both sides.

Some now contend that one should not ask for on-site inspections for underground tests. While there have been generalizations about the adequacy of national systems, few seriously contend that such systems can identify every seismic event as either an earthquake or an explosion. Rather the contention is that the United States and other countries should accept the risk of cheating because the Soviet Union is prepared to do so.

However, are the situations existing in the United States and in the Soviet Union the same? The Soviet Union knows that United States underground tests in violation of a publicly-proclaimed international treaty could not be concealed from a free press in a free country. The United States has no similar assurance with regard to the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The difference between the two societies in the providing of information about underground tests is evident even in the absence of a treaty banning such tests. As permitted by the limited test-ban Treaty, the United States is conducting a programme of underground tests. We have disclosed this programme to the world. One can read about it in our newspapers, and it is no secret. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, does not announce its underground tests. It is, we believe, conducting an active underground nuclear-testing programme. For example, on 29 June, about a week ago, the United States recorded seismic signals which we suspect were not caused by natural phenomena. They were from the Soviet nuclear-testing area.

We do not conclude, because of an active underground test programme which is permitted by the limited test-ban Treaty, that the Soviet Union desires to torpedo negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. That charge was made by the Soviet Union against the United States on 14 June (ENDC/PV.264, p.21) and once more this morning. However, I think the Soviet representative might confirm the existence of a Soviet testing programme if he expects others to trust the Soviet Union's representations about its own nuclear testing. In any event, I hope he will no longer speak of underground testing as an activity being conducted solely by the United States.

In an area so affecting our national security as nuclear weapon development, no one can rely solely on trust. In the period since the Second World War, nuclear weapons have played a central role in maintaining in the world a military balance which, so far at least, has been more stable than at some other periods in history. We regret as deeply as anyone that such particularly deadly weapons have had to play that role; but we all know they have. Until our efforts can be successful, let us hope the balance will continue to be a stable one.

The United States does not propose to take risks with that balance. In any area so closely affecting our security as nuclear weapon development, we intend to move with prudence and caution. That does not mean that we oppose banning all nuclear tests, if such a ban can be verified. On the contrary, the United States has sought for many years, and continues actively to seek, a comprehensive test ban. In July 1965 President Johnson told our Committee that "a truly comprehensive test-ban Treaty" was one of

(Mr. Foster, United States)

the objectives he had instructed our delegation to pursue "with all the determination and wisdom they can command" (ENDC/150). As we reconvened here in January, he said that the United States:

"... persists in its belief that the perils of proliferation would be materially reduced by an extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground nuclear tests" (ENDC/165, p.2).

Those instructions continue to guide the United States delegation. Indeed, if we really did not want an underground ban, we could easily avoid making progress toward one by taking extreme positions on inspection and making no effort to find an acceptable compromise. But we have not insisted on perfection, and we have continually made new suggestions to ease the inspection problem.

At our 229th and 232nd meetings last summer I described the results of the extensive research the United States has carried out so that increased reliance on national systems would be possible. We have not sought inspections for seismic events which could be identified by such systems.

At our meeting of 4 April Mr. Fisher described the results of research designed to make inspections as simple as possible (ENDC/PV.254, pp. 21, 22). We have found that radioactive fission-product gases will probably leak slowly towards the surface from underground nuclear explosions. Therefore we have worked out new scientific techniques for detecting, collecting and analysing those gases.

At earlier meetings my delegation has made a number of other proposals to ease the inspection problem. We have said that a country being inspected could institute all the safeguards it considered necessary to prevent inspectors from looking at sensitive defence installations, subject only to the condition that the inspection team arrive promptly at the area to be inspected (ENDC/78, p.3). Thus we have said that the receiving country could use its own aircraft and pilots to carry the inspection team. We have said that it could seal off windows to prevent the team from looking at the territory en route. We have even said that the inspected country could ask that sensitive defence installations which happened to be in the requested inspection area should not be inspected. Such installations would then not be inspected.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

These proposals are hardly the work of a country which does not want a comprehensive test ban. However, they have not been enough to dispel the unfounded apprehensions of the Soviet Union. As the representative of Canada observed at our meeting on 19 April last, the Soviet Union has accomplished "great scientific feats in the exploration of outer space" (ENDC/PV.257, p.9). It has displayed daring, creative initiative and tremendous effort. Unfortunately, that has certainly not been true of its policies regarding verification to make possible arms control agreements, such as the one I have been describing. I do not say that that shows lack of interest in a comprehensive test ban. However, if we wish to bridge the gap between us, there must be some efforts on both sides. If the Soviet Union is now ready to do so, it could easily contribute to bridging that gap.

The Soviet Union has maintained that "the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions" is "quite adequate for monitoring" a ban on all underground nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/PV.230, p.9). The United States has devoted major efforts to improving seismic detection and identification techniques, but we are unable to achieve the confidence implied by the Soviet statements. Many times in the past we have suggested that, if the Soviet Government has information on how to detect and identify all underground events by using distant instrumentation, it should supply that information to other governments. That suggestion has been met with a wall of silence.

Our sole concern today, as in the past, is to produce a comprehensive test-ban treaty which will give the world confidence that it is being observed by all parties. Accordingly, again we invite the Soviet Union and any and all delegations here to submit any data or research results which may be helpful in attaining that end.

I wish to turn now to the interesting proposals which were made here last week for dealing with underground tests. Mr. Gomez Robledo called our attention to the provisions of the April 1962 eight-nation joint memorandum on cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/28). He also renewed his suggestion for a panel of qualified scientists from non-aligned countries who would be available to assist with on-site inspections (ENDC/PV.269, p.26). In our opinion, both the joint memorandum and the additional suggestion regarding non-aligned inspectors contain helpful features. I should now like to discuss several of those features.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Paragraph 3 of the joint memorandum suggests the establishment of a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. It also suggests that such a system might be built upon already-existing national networks. It recognizes that improvements could no doubt be achieved by furnishing observation posts in existing national networks with more advanced instrumentation. We believe that constructive possibilities do exist in the area of building upon existing national networks and furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation.

The fourth paragraph of the joint memorandum raises the possibility of establishing an international commission which might process data and report on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data. That paragraph also refers to an "obligation" by all the parties to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event.

We have long believed that an international commission suitably constituted could provide a framework which would be helpful in monitoring the observance of test-ban obligations. In the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom (ENDC/78) of 1 April 1963 an important role was contemplated for an international commission. It was our intention to simplify the role of the commission as much as possible so as to facilitate reaching agreement on such elements as the composition of the commission. This is clearly a matter which might well be seriously considered here.

Finally, paragraph 5 of the joint memorandum provides that, if the commission cannot reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event, it might seek clarification from the party concerned. Consultations would take place concerning measures of clarification, "including verification in loco" (ENDC/28, p.2). It is clear that such verification would be part of the obligation of each party to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any unidentified event in those few cases where no other facts would suffice. Paragraph 4, which sets forth the obligation to provide the necessary facts, also says that one way of satisfying that obligation is by a visit to the territory of the country where the unidentified event took place "and/or the site of the event ..." (ibid.).

The joint memorandum, as we are all aware, does not specify any particular number or quota of on-site inspections. However, it does seem helpful in that it recognizes the appropriateness and usefulness of such inspections.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

At our meeting last Thursday, 30 June; Mr. Gomez Robledo also renewed the Mexican delegation's suggestion that a panel of qualified experts from non-aligned countries could be available to assist in on-site inspection (ENDC/PV.269, p.26). The Anglo-American memorandum of 1 April 1963 stated that an inspection team could consist partly of persons from the international staff of the commission and partly of persons from the nuclear-weapon State desiring the inspection. That would provide effective participation by both. There is, of course, a definite relationship between the extent to which reliance is placed on adversary, or reciprocal, inspection and the extent to which inspection procedures and commission regulations can be simplified. Clearly, if adversary, or reciprocal, inspection forms the major element, a nuclear side requesting an inspection may be more willing to accept simplified procedures.

I should like now to make some brief comments on the statement of the representative of India at our meeting of 30 June. He proposed that, in the first instance there be a suspension of all tests (ibid., p.25). Since no inspection procedures were suggested for that initial suspension, we suppose that it means an unverified moratorium on all tests that cannot be verified by existing means. We oppose such a moratorium because of our unwillingness to accept on trust the observance by others of restrictions which significantly affect our security.

Mr. Trivedi also renewed recommendations for international co-operation in the field of exchanging seismological data, recommendations which are quite similar to those given unanimous voice by the eight in their joint memoranda of 14 September 1964 (ENDC/145) and 15 September 1965 (ENDC/159). Recommendations of that sort have had our strong support.

Whether or not the United States agrees with every suggestion put forth, it does nevertheless welcome all serious proposals designed to advance our negotiations. Non-aligned delegations clearly have made proposals of such a character in the important area of reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban. My delegation has also attempted to advance our work by describing the results of extensive research in the field of seismology and by suggesting simplified inspection procedures (ENDC/PV.254).

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The conclusion cannot be escaped that it is now time for the delegation of the Soviet Union to make similar constructive contributions to our work. Such a contribution would, of course, be most welcome in the key area of verification. To us it seems inconceivable that a nation of the size, strength and achievements of the Soviet Union will long continue to feel that a relatively small number of inspections, regulated by internationally-agreed procedures, can somehow damage that country and its security. We continue to hope that, sooner rather than later, the Soviet Union will display in our crucial field of arms control the same daring, creativity and effort which it has displayed in the important field of the exploration of outer space.

Mr. ROSECHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The representative of the United States referred in his statement today to a question to which we have also referred in our intervention. The question is a very important one: namely the prohibition of all underground tests. The Soviet delegation will study that statement with due attention and at a later meeting of the Committee will give appropriate explanations and replies to the questions that are raised in it.

At the same time one cannot fail to regret that the representative of the United States, in approaching this important problem of the prohibition of all nuclear tests, should have introduced into the consideration of the problem new elements which deliberately complicate the possibilities of the search for a solution to this urgent question. Thus today he advanced yet another argument in an attempt to show that there were difficulties in solving this problem: the argument about so-called closed and open societies. I must say this argument is hackneyed, far-fetched and, I would say, of a definitely slanderous nature. Of course, it will not help to make it any easier for us to examine and solve with full awareness the problem which we are now considering.

When, for example, the question of concluding the Moscow Treaty was being examined, nobody advanced that argument as an obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments. Therefore the putting forward of that argument by the representative of the United States can only lead to a further complication, a complication without any need whatsoever. We



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have the impression that, in putting forward that argument, the United States is doing so in order to demonstrate once more its lack of desire for a concrete solution of this question and that in this connexion it is trying to discover unreal, far-fetched arguments. That is the comment we wished to make in connexion with the statement of the representative of the United States.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I do not wish to prolong this argument, but I think it is perfectly clear why, in connexion with the limited test-ban Treaty, we did not speak of the difficulties caused by the differences between an open and a closed society. The difference in the limited test-ban Treaty is that we had, and knew we had, national capabilities to detect and identify any events that took place or might take place in the three environments to which that treaty applied.

We have made it perfectly clear, and it is a scientifically-known fact, that underground there are a number of events which it is impossible to identify. For that reason we ask for the verification of events which appear to have significance and for which, as far as we know -- and our own activities in this field have been more extensive perhaps than those of any other nation -- there are as yet no means of both detection and identification. Again I request that, if the Soviet Union has those means, it share its knowledge of them with others, so that we may proceed to the achievement of such a comprehensive treaty.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 271st meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Sir Harold Beeley, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, the USSR and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 12 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

